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Abstract. The evolution of information technologies have brought us to a point 
where we are confronted with the existence of agents - computational entities - 
which are able to act autonomously with little or no human intervention. And 
their behavior can damage individual or collective interests that are protected by 
criminal law. 
Based on the analysis of different models of criminal responsibility of legal 
persons - which constituted an interesting advance in the criminal law in rela-
tion to what was hitherto traditionally accepted -, we will appraise whether the 









1  Software Agents and Objects – an Introduction 
 
An “agent” is a computational entity (software/hardware) that “being located in a 
defined environment acts upon it by autonomous actions, having a defined goal to 
accomplish” (Wooldridge and Jennings 1994).  Thus being, the “agent” performs 
tasks on behalf of a user in a predefined computational environment, with little or no 
human intervention at all (Wong and Sycara 1999, 1). The agent is capable of analys-
ing its environment and the problem data and of deciding accordingly, in an inde-
pendent way (Durfee and Rosenschein 1994; Wooldridge 2009).  
An important distinction must be considered between “agents” and “objects” 
(Wooldridge and Jennings 1994). Obviously, the degree of autonomy is much bigger 
in “agents” (Wooldridge and Jennings 1994).  But also the definition of communica-
tion mechanisms and used language must be considered (Wooldridge and Jennings 
1994). An object is an entity capable of storing an inner state, of using a set of meth-
ods acting upon that inner state and of communicating through messages (Durfee and 
Rosenschein 1994; Wooldridge 2009); the object has autonomy in the sense that it 
controls its own state but, contrarily to agents, is not capable of controlling its own 
behaviour (Durfee and Rosenschein 1994; Wooldridge 2009).  Decision control cen-
tres are different in objects and in agents. And it can be said that objects have a static 
behaviour while “agents” have a dynamic behaviour (Brito and Neves 2000; Durfee 
and Rosenschein 1994; Wooldridge 2009). Another difference arises out of the defini-
tion of the dialog mechanism, more complex in “agents” than in objects (Jennings 
1999; Wooldridge 2009). And it may be said that while both “agents” and objects 
have an identity, a state and a behaviour of its own, actually “agents” may be de-
scribed in terms of a set of characteristics integrating knowledge, beliefs, desires, 
intentions, aims and even obligations (Fasli 2007; Georgeff et al 1999).  
An “agent” is thus a program capable of acting in a flexible way, on behalf of its 
owner, user or client1, in order to reach defined goals. So, it must present a set of 
properties or characteristics (Wooldridge 2002) such as autonomy (capacity of taking 
decisions on which actions to undertake without having to be constantly inquiring the 
user), reactivity (Weitzenboeck 2001, 4) (capacity of properly responding to prevail-
ing circumstances in dynamic and unpredictable environments), proactivity (Weit-
zenboeck 2001, 4) (capacity of acting in anticipation of future goals), communication, 
cooperation and sociability (Weitzenboeck 2001, 4) and adaptive behaviour.  This 
said, it must be stated that “agents” are not limited to data interchange (such as EDI – 
Electronic Data Interchange) but are capable of communicating in complex conversa-
tional environments and of assuming different roles, as well as adapting to diverse 
situations (Fasli 2007, 59).  
Autonomy is one of the most relevant features of “software agents”, implying the 
possibility of acting and performing tasks without any human intervention. A “soft-
ware agent” is independent and acts autonomously, having control both of its inner 
state and of its behaviour, being capable of clearly understanding the goals of its mis-
sion and of defining a strategy in order to reach the defined goals. Of course, the lev-
els of autonomy may greatly vary (Russel and Norvig 1995, 35) and although the 
“software agent” may decide autonomously, without any human intervention, the user 
may have more or less capacity of controlling the parameters influencing the behav-
iour of the agent (Chavez and Maes 1996, 8). But the greater autonomy of new gener-
ations of “software agents”, capable not only of acting within pre-established parame-
ters but also of having initiative and deciding, by themselves, what, when and how to 
do, upon favourable conditions (in the perspective of the “software agent”!) may force 
us to distinguish the situations in which the user will still have some control upon the 
                                                          
1 Obviously, we are not considering a legal framework (which does not exist) for the actuation 
of software agents.  
strategy to be followed by the “software agent” or at least upon the main parameters 
of decision (Chavez and Maes 1996, 8) from the cases when this control will be total-
ly lost and only the trust (or lack of trust) of the user in the “software agent” capabili-
ties remains. And we may even have to face the possibility of the “software agent”, 
reasoning upon the available data, overcoming what the user may reasonably have 
foreseen (Dowling 2000, 3). 
Software agents are not considered as persons. Yet, they have this capacity of au-
tonomous acting and their acting may well modify the legal position of legal persons. 
Furthermore, it may be considered that software agents have something more or less 
equivalent to a “will” or at least what may be called “intentional states” (Sartor 2003, 
23-51; Sartor 2009, 253-290).   
The intentionality of software agents brings along the issue of the legal considera-
tion of the acts of software agents (Andrade et al 2007). For the moment being, soft-
ware agents are not considered as legal persons and the most plausible solution for the 
consideration of their legal acts is the one suggested by Giovanni Sartor of having 
commercial corporations specially created for the use of software agents (2002). Thus 
being, liability for the acts of software agents would impend on commercial corpora-
tions (Wettig 2003; Wettig and Zehendner 2004). This will force us, when concerning 
criminal responsibilities, to analyse the issue of the consideration of criminal liability 
of the corporations.   
 
 
2 Criminal Liability of Legal Persons 
 
 In fact, one of the most troublesome questions that criminal law is currently facing 
is the criminal liability of corporations or legal persons.  Should criminal penalties be 
solely imposed upon an individual or should also a legal person be subjected to those 
penalties and, being so, in what way would that occur? 
It is a rather old question but still widely disputed in the context of criminal policy 
and criminal law, for which, to use an example that is closer to us, only in 2007, with 
several amendments to the Criminal Code, the Portuguese legislator gave a pragmatic 
and definitive answer. 
Despite that, the replacement of the old principle of Roman law societas delin-
quere non potest has been gradually accepted in countries of Anglo-Saxon legal tradi-
tion, such as the United States, which is believed to be one of the first countries to do 
it, or the UK and in many countries of different legal traditions. 
Such a solution – the criminal liability of legal persons – appears to be not only es-
sential for a timely and adequate response of criminal law to an increasingly complex 
human society, but it also meets the requirements imposed by various international 
bodies such as the European Union, the Council of Europe and the United Nations, 
which require States to adopt the necessary legislative measures in order to sanction 
legal persons for acts that constitute certain offenses. 
However, despite this demand for the accountability of legal persons, there is no 
consensus on the actual manner this should be done.  Many different models of re-
sponsibility of legal persons exist, and they range from mere tort liability to criminal 
liability. 
The specific reason why there are doubts whether criminal law, a body of law 
which, as we all know, should only be applied as last resort, when all legal remedies 
are insufficient, should apply, has to do with two fundamental concepts in criminal 
law theory: agency/conduct (the common law actus reus or the german Handlung) 
and blameworthiness (mens rea or Schuld2). These are the core challenges necessary 
to overcome in order to legitimate criminal liability of legal entities. 
On the one hand, some authors, including most German authors, defend that the 
notion of action in the criminal law framework demonstrates that legal entities are not 
able to act for themselves. Only the natural or physical persons may carry out behav-
iours that are criminally relevant. And as such, criminal responsibility cannot fall on a 
legal entity, but rather on the individual (Correia 2010, 234; Martín 1996, 43-45). 
On the other hand, many say that it is impossible to morally and ethically judge le-
gal entities for not acting lawfully (despite having the opportunity to abide by the 
law), due to the fact that blameworthiness for an unlawful action demands the exist-
ence of an agent that has free and conscious will and chooses to break the law in an 
hypothesis where he/she could and should have acted differently (Castro e Sousa 
1985, 114) - in this sense only individuals possess “personal qualities necessary to be 
censured for not acting differently”(Castro e Sousa 1985, 114). Therefore, the conclu-
sion should be obvious: regarding the lack of ontological unfitness to be blamed, legal 
entities cannot be held criminally accountable (Dias 2012, 196). Accordingly, only 
the individuals that have committed the relevant criminal acts on behalf of legal enti-
ties or in their interest can suffer criminal sanctions, and not the legal entities them-
selves.  
However, one must not neglect that we live in a rapidly evolving society character-
ized by the discourse of the global risk society (Beck 1992), which entails a profound 
paradigm shift in our cultural, economic, sociological and technological dimensions 
as a community, and brings paramount changes to the way criminality materializes. 
There is an increasing criminality that involves a greater complexity and organization, 
frequently having corporations, societies and associations as key actors. Thus, it 
seems accurate the idea expressed by Figueiredo Dias: if we chose to only prosecute 
and punish physical or biological persons acting on behalf of legal entities, complete-
ly waiving criminal accountability of the latter, that would mean that (given the de-
gree of complexity, not only of the committed crimes, especially those against the 
economy, but also of these legal entities’ organizational structures) it would be im-
                                                          
2 Despite not being totally equivalent, the English legal term mens rea and the german legal 
term Schuld are, for simplicity reasons, treated as functional equivalents for the purpose of 
this paper. It should be noted however that depending on the perspective that one assumes 
on the concept of crime, more especifically, whether it is a classic approach (of such authors 
as Liszt, Beling and Berner), a neoclassical approach (Mezger), a teleological theory 
(Welzel) or a functional-teleological and rational system (Schünemann and Roxin), the 
translation of mens rea to german can be subjektiver Tatbestand and/or Schuld. 
possible to specifically determine the individuals that should be held responsible. And 
so there would be absolute impunity (Dias 1983, 51). 
Thus, assuming that there is a need for a real and autonomous criminal responsibil-
ity of legal persons, how can we overcome these dogmatic obstacles upheld by the 
traditional thinking of criminal law? 
The answers vary. In the Portuguese legal order, Figueiredo Dias rejects the argu-
ments of inability of agency and blameworthiness of legal entities and considers ade-
quate the implementation of a so-called analogic model (2012, 198). According to 
this Author, “the individuals can be replaced, as criminally responsible, both objec-
tively and subjectively, ethical and social hubs, by their collective work and material-
ization, such as legal entities, associations, groupings or corporations, in which free 
beings express themselves” (2012, 198).  
Faria Costa, on the other hand, although not recognizing in his first writings the 
criminal liability of legal entities (1981, 43), later admits the plausibility of their pun-
ishment in light of the theory he coined as material rationality of opposite places 
(1992, 537). The legitimacy of this type of criminal liability is based on a material 
analogy between the behaviour of natural persons and legal persons: if under 16, natu-
ral persons, although having capability to act, are exempt from criminal responsibil-
ity, as stated by article 19 of the Portuguese Criminal Code, then it would not be total-
ly unreasonable to accept the punishment of legal persons despite not being physically 
and anthropologically capable of acting. According to Faria Costa, the criminal justice 
system, through “axioms developed by criminal dogmatics” (1992, 551), constructs “a 
space of normativity whose essential feature is represented by the absence of a partic-
ular characteristic” (1992, 552). This space of normativity can “enlighten and justify, 
in terms of material rationality, its opposite place” (1992, 553). And so, if with the 
infancy defence “we have the curtailment of ontological segments of action, here, 
inversely, there is an extension of a communicational act, criminally relevant; if with 
infants we limit and remove blameworthiness, here, inversely, the notion blame is 
reconstructed and the legal person becomes a true centre of imputation” (1992, 553). 
These theoretical solutions, of greater expressiveness in Portugal, are obviously not 
exclusive. Examining comparative law, particularly civil law (continental law) coun-
tries, we observe that this topic has been debated to exhaustion and to the same ex-
haustion answers have been offered which aim to support and implement the notion of 
blameworthiness of legal entities (Dias 2012, 299): imputation model – Zurech-
nungsmodell – according to which guilt and action of the responsible corporation 
boards are imputed to the legal person; model of the culpability of the organization – 
Modell des Organisationsverschuldens (Tiedemann 1988) – that recognizes the exist-
ence of a specific and autonomous blameworthiness of the legal entity, which derives 
from the idea that the legal entity provides a favourable environment for the practice 
of certain crimes; model of prevention – Präventionsmodel (Schünemann, 1994) – 
which acknowledges the possibility of sanctioning legal entities with security 
measures; and, finally, the model of analogue blameworthiness (Heine 1995, 241), 
where an analogue imputation of blameworthiness is shed on the legal entity, having 
as a criteria of criminal imputation an appraisal of the way business was carried out 
(Betriebsführungsschuld). 
From the point of view of Common Law (Ormerod 2008, 247), we reach the con-
clusion that opinions are mainly divided between the doctrine of identification and the 
vicarious liability (or agency doctrine)3. The first theory sets up an overlap between 
the conduct and blameworthiness of individuals in positions of leadership and the 
conduct and blameworthiness of the legal entity. In other words, those individuals 
represent the “body” and “mind” of the legal entity and therefore the acts carried out 
by them must be regarded as being done by the legal entity itself. Meanwhile, the 
advocates of the second theory stress the liability of the legal entity for the conduct of 
its agents, meaning that the legal entity is charged with criminal responsibility for the 
actions of agents such as directors, supervisors, etc. 
 
 
3 Models of Criminal Liability of Autonomous Agents: an 
Appraisal 
 
Having outlined the main points of interest on criminal liability of legal entities, a 
few questions arise: Are there such substantial differences between legal entities and 
autonomous agents that justify the exemption from criminal responsibility of the lat-
ter? Is it plausible to conceive criminal responsibility of autonomous agents or AI 
entities? 
Traditionally AI entities are considered not to have legal personhood. They are said 
to be mere objects4. And this is may be the punctum crucis of this question. Through-
out the different branches of law (civil law, administrative law, etc.), and in particular 
criminal law, there is one key distinction that is commonly made between subject (or 
agent) and object. According to George P. Fletcher, "[a] subject is someone who acts, 
and an object is someone or something that is acted upon" (1998, 43). Although sim-
ple in its wording, it encompasses complex issues, which we face namely when ad-
dressing “software agents” or “artificial entities”. 
The criminal liability of artificial entities has been a rather unknown territory for 
legal scholars5. There are a few exceptions however.    
                                                          
3 There are other approaches to corporate liability, such as the aggregation theory (also termed 
as collective knowledge doctrine), the culpable corporate culture, the reactive corporate 
fault. 
4 Here we use the common notion of objects and not “objects” in the sense we referred in the 
beginning of this paper. 
5 We can find an interesting account on this topic on LEGAL-IST Consortium’s Report on 
Legal Issues of Software Agents, Doc. No. D14, Rev. No. 2, 29 March 2006, which for lia-
bility purposes drafts a fruitful analogy between software agents (owner of certain cognitive 
capabilities and mental states) and trained dogs, coined by the authors as the dog model. 
This model starts by assuming that both software agent and trained dog are programmed to 
autonomously pursue assigned tasks and goals. Depending on the direction and level of 
training/programming, the dog’s and agent’s cannot be completely foreseen in advance, 
Gabriel Hallevy has proposed three models of the criminal liability of artificial in-
telligence entities: Perpetration-via-Another Liability Model; Natural-Probable-
Consequence Liability Model; Direct Liability Model (2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2012). 
They present a sound foundation on which this topic could be further developed and, 
as such, we should therefore understand the main characteristics of each model. 
The first model considers that the AI does not possess any human attribute and so 
denies the possibility of having the AI as a perpetrator of an offense. It is seen as akin 
to mentally limited persons, such as a child, a person who is mentally incompetent or 
one who lacks a criminal state of mind. The AI entity is an innocent agent that is a 
mere instrument used by the real perpetrator, who architects the offense and consti-
tutes the real mastermind behind it. As such, the person behind the AI is to be held 
accountable for the conduct (actus reus) of the AI, albeit the subjective or internal 
element (mens rea) is determined by the perpetrator-via-another’s mental state.  
The perpetrator-via-another can either be the programmer or the user: the pro-
grammer, when he designs an AI entity with the purpose of committing criminal of-
fenses, or the user (end-user), that, albeit not designing the AI entity, is in control of 
it, and uses it to commit offenses. 
It should be noted that this model assumes that the AI is completely dependent on 
either the programmer or the user. It is not self-ruling or self-determining, but solely 
an instrument (equivalent to a hammer or even a dog used for illicit purposes) for 
which no specific mental state is required, e.g. a programmer creates an AI entity to 
destroy computer data. 
Accordingly, this model would not be implemented in hypotheses where the AI en-
tity decides to commit an offense based on its own accumulated experience or 
knowledge; commits an offense despite not being programmed to do so; acts as a 
semi-innocent agent6. 
The second model – coined Natural-Probable-Consequence Liability Model – pre-
supposes that the programmer or user of the AI entity, despite not programming or 
using it for the purpose of committing a certain crime, might be held accountable for 
the crime committed by the AI entity, if the offense is a natural and probable conse-
quence of the AI’s conduct. Even though the programmer or user was not aware that 
the offense was committed until it had already been committed, did not plan to com-
mit any offense and did not take part in the commission of the offense, if there is evi-
                                                                                                                                          
which in turn can lead to unwanted results or even illicit. Disregarding the possibility of 
holding the AI (Artificial Intelligence) entity directly liable for its actions, there could be 
criminal responsibility of the developer or user (or in dog’s case, the trainer or the owner) 
for their negligence, imprudence or unskillfulness – this is in essence what is described in 
the Natural-Probable-Consequence Liability Model. In the hypothesis of wilful misconduct 
by the trainer/owner/developer/user, criminal liability would rest upon the subject to whom 
the fact can be led back. 
6 Hallevy, Gabriel: The Matrix of Derivative Criminal Liability, p. 38. Springer, Heidelberg 
(2012), describes a semi-innocent agent as “a negligent party that is not fully aware of the 
factual situation while any other reasonable person could have been aware of it under the 
same circumstances”. 
dence that they could and should foresee the potential commission of offenses, then 
they might be prosecuted for the offense.  
So, this model does not require the criminal intention of the programmers or the 
users, as the first model does, but only their negligence, which is criminally relevant 
due to the fact that a diligent and reasonable programmer and user should be able to 
foresee the offense and prevent it from happening7, e.g. a programmer sets up an AI 
entity to protect a computer system and the latter decides, as part of its mission, to 
seriously hinder a computer system which it considers a potential threat. 
Finally, the Direct Liability Model – the third and last model – aims at providing a 
theoretical framework for a functional equivalence between AI entities and humans 
for criminal liability purposes. For this reason, this model deserves greater attention in 
our analysis, as it constitutes the main focus of our paper. Gabriel Hallevy’s reasoning 
stems from the idea that criminal liability implicates solely the fulfilment of two dif-
ferent requirements: actus reus (external element) and mens rea (internal element) 
and if AI entities were able to fulfil them both then criminal accountability would 
follow.  
We have no doubt that if such liability of AI entities were to exist, it should not re-
place the programmer or user’s liability. Both could co-exist, if all the legal require-
ments were fulfilled, meaning that the criminal liability of AI entities would not ex-
clude the individual responsibility of programmer or users nor would it depend on the 
criminal accountability of those – similar to what is commonly done when punishing 
legal entities, where criminal punishment of the individuals behind the legal entity 
does not constitute a requirement to have the criminal punishment of legal entities 
themselves. But the problem remains: do AI entities fulfil all necessary requirements 
to trigger criminal liability?  
On one side, regarding the actus reus requirement, it is insufficient to propose its 
fulfilment only when AI entities control a mechanical or other mechanism to move its 
moving parts (e.g. robots). In our view, this argument should clearly be regarded as 
unbearably limited. If we were to establish the criminal liability of AI entities, why 
should those be solely responsible when it is proved that they controlled mechanical 
instruments or others of the same sort? It seems to be nothing more than an unjustifia-
ble overlap between AI entities and robots. The former, as we know, is not the same 
as the latter. One example that clearly shows that this confusion between terms can 
lead to unjust results has to do with computer offenses. Let us imagine that the AI 
                                                          
7 Under this model, Gabriel Hallevy devises two situations that bring different outcomes. The 
first situation is when programmers or users did not want to commit any offense but negli-
gently programmed or used the AI entity and an offense occurred. In this hypothesis, pro-
grammer and user should be held accountable for an offence, as long as there is a negligent 
offense stated by criminal law for that type of cases. The second situation deals with accom-
plice liability cases, namely when programmers or users programmed or used the AI to 
commit one offense, but the latter committed another, in addition or instead of the planned 
one. The author proposes the punishment of the programmer or the user as if they acted with 
knowledge and intent. Alongside the criminal liability of the programmer or the user, the AI 
entity, provided that did not act as an innocent agent, could be directly held liability for its 
actions. 
entity, merely software, intentionally decides to target a computer system with a deni-
al-of-service attack (DoS attack). Shouldn’t the AI entity be held criminally responsi-
ble here as well? 
To perceive the fulfilment of the actus reus requirement as having willed muscular 
movement (in this case, mechanical) or bodily movement is to ignore that there are 
crimes without actus reus or acts in a traditional sense – e.g. computer crimes. Unless 
we consider that the physical act in computer crimes resides in electronic impulses – 
which seems to be a far-fetched and unnecessary argument –, to suggest that actus 
reus equals the traditional definition of act is inadmissible. As Figueiredo Dias (2012, 
240) and David Ormerod (2008, 51) remind us, it is misleading or even strange to say 
that, for example, in the crime of defamation the relevant act corresponds to the 
movement of one's tongue, mouth and vocal chords. For these reasons, the traditional 
view of acts as willed voluntary movements is seen, in recent years, as outdated (Her-
ring 2012, 106)8. 
More importantly we should emphasize the fact that in order to occur the criminal 
liability of an agent, the conduct proscribed by a certain crime must be done volun-
tarily. What this actually means it is something yet to achieve consensus, as concepts 
as consciousness, will, voluntariness and control are often bungled and lost between 
arguments of philosophy, psychology and neurology, leading the judiciary and legal 
scholars alike to prefer stating the cases where there is not a voluntary act (Hamilton 
2011; Saunders 1987-1988, 447). In these cases, as Jonathan Herring affirms, “an 
involuntary action is one for which not only is the defendant not responsible, it is not 
even properly described as his act” (2012, 105). So, the voluntariness requirement 
serves the purpose of excluding from criminal liability those acts that are mere au-
tomatisms (Ormerod 2008, 55; Dias 2012, 305) or done unconsciously. This fact 
makes clear that AI entities should only be made criminally accountable if they volun-
tarily acted, which means that must be an act done with will, volition or control. Ac-
cordingly, we cannot say that an AI entity voluntarily acted if the presence of one of 
these internal elements, depending on what particular theory one follows on the char-
acterization of the “voluntarily” concept, is not found in a certain situation. While 
these elements describe a certain internal state of the agent, they should not however 
be confused with mens rea (Saunders 1987-1988, 443-445). There can be volition 
without mens rea, but the contrary is not true9. Thus, before turning to a closer insight 
on mens rea, it becomes necessary to call volition (or will or control) into question. 
While we may find easy to note that volition and human acts generally appear hand in 
hand, and so in the acts of legal entities, to plunge into the same conclusion as to AI 
entities’ acts would arguably be precipitated.  
Additionally, criminal courts and legal scholars demand the existence of a human 
action, which means that this voluntary act, whatever it may be, must be carried out 
                                                          
8 When it comes to punish an absence of behaviour (omission) it must be proved that there was 
a duty to act and the agent failed to perform such a duty.  
9 Saunders (1997-1988) gives the example of the athlete who, during an athletic competition, 
throws a javelin, after being sure that no person was in his path, but a bystander is hit by the 
javelin and dies. Despite not having mens rea in causing the death of the bystander, there is 
a voluntary act which consists in throwing the javelin. 
by humans and not inanimate objects or animals. This, for us, shows that voluntari-
ness being expressed as a requirement is deeply tangled with demanding human agen-
cy. But, as we stated previously, human agency is no longer an absolute and unsur-
passable criteria: legal entities are now criminally liable for certain offenses – which 
could open the path for having criminal responsibility of AI entities. 
Finally, recognizing mens rea of AI entities can pose a difficult challenge to over-
come. There is first a matter of determining the specific level of development of a 
particular AI entity. Not all AI entities bear the same capabilities, e.g., cognitive skills 
and abilities, and this should be reflected on whether mens rea can be attributed to an 
AI entity. Secondly, a certain state of mind, which differs from one crime to another, 
must be attributed to the accused.  Some Authors remind us that the only mental re-
quirements needed to impose criminal liability are knowledge, intent, negligence, 
among others, and peremptorily affirm that knowledge and specific intent can be at-
tributed to AI entities when these have sensory receptors of factual data, which in turn 
is analysed by the AI entity (Hallevy 2010, 188). Even if AI have sensors which pro-
vide them with data that could be processed internally, can we say that the AI entity 
understands or comprehends what is being processed? This would lead us to the high-
ly controversial “Chinese Room Argument” of John Searle, which is the subject of a 
never-ending debate with inconclusive results. 
Additionally there is the problem that predicates on determining blameworthiness 
of AI entities. Mens rea can be referred to in its general sense or in its special sense 
(Kadish and Schulhofer 2001, 203; Herring 2012, 134; Wilson 2008, 116).  To de-
mand the presence of a certain mental state in the agent, which is described by the 
offense, is to demand mens rea in its special sense. But this is not sufficient.  Criminal 
law must ensure that there is only punishment when the agent is at fault (Jefferson 
2008, 86). So we must pose the question: can there be any blameworthiness in AI 
entities’ actions that enables their legal punishment? 
Criminal conviction encompasses a censure (Herring 2011, 67) of the agent for act-
ing in a certain fashion. And this relates to the element of guilt/blame/Schuld that has 
to be present. Guilt or Schuld is seen, by some Authors (e.g. Kaufmann), as censuring 
someone for acting unlawfully when he could have acted differently; or for acting 
unlawfully as a result of not promoting a law abiding character or personality (e.g. 
Mezger). But blameworthiness supposes a free being – with conscious and free will 
(Dias 2012, 279) – that has a choice in determining his essence. Although criminal 
law was used, until late eighteenth century, to punish animals for crimes such as hom-
icide and theft (Wilson 2008, 117), it seems now that invoking criminal law for these 
cases is, in light of the reasons behind criminal punishment – either retribution, deter-
rence, rehabilitation or restoration, rather useless and unjust10. But as far as science 
goes, animals lack this ability to become cognizant and influence the “self”, at least at 
                                                          
10 There are however recent studies that challenge the traditional deterministic view of animal 
behaviour - Brembs, Björn: Towards a scientific concept of free will as a biological trait: 
spontaneous actions and decision-making in invertebrates. Proc. R. Soc. B, vol. 278, no. 
1707, 930-939 (2011). And those who proclaim the idea that animals share with humans the 
possession of neurological substrates that generate consciousness, see The Cambridge Dec-
laration on Consciousness, July 7, 2012. 
the same level humans do (Morris 2006). On the other hand, remembering what was 
stated above on criminal liability of legal entities, there is a theory that could well be 
called into action: the analogic model (Dias 2012, 298). Individuals, or biological 
people, are free beings that, for criminal purposes, can and should be replaced by their 
work - as ethical and social cores that too are “products of freedom” or “materializa-
tion of free beings” (Dias 2012, 298). Provided that AI entities have self-awareness, 
self-consciousness, free and conscious will, ability to apprehend the (un)lawfulness of 
their behaviour and means to guide themselves by law, the minimum requirements to 
call forth their blameworthiness and, hence their criminal responsibility, are present, 
since they too - AI entities - could embody social and ethical cores, as they are human 
creations, either directly or indirectly. As a result, in this hypothesis, we reach the 
dogmatic, juridical and technological apparatus to enable AI entities as active legal 
actors in criminal justice. 
      
 
4    Conclusion 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
The criminal liability of legal person persons has constituted an innovative break-
through in criminal law and the models used to support such an advance can provide 
us with invaluable clues to unveil a plausible dogmatic framework for the criminal 
responsibility of artificial entities. But more importantly, it demonstrates a certain 
degree of flexibility shown by criminal law when criminal policy demands so.  
A flexibility that can be used provided that certain dogmatic premises are met, to 
justify the punishment of AI entities. The question then will not be anymore whether 
“can we do it?” but “should we?”, “why?” and “how”? 
Relying on previous studies put forwarded by Reynolds and Ishikawa, Ugo Pagallo 
considers three examples of criminal robots (Pagallo 2011, 311-313): Picciotto Ro-
boto11; Robot Kleptomaniac12 and Robot Falsifier13, and then points out that today’s 
state-of-the-art in technology is not capable of producing a “Robot Kleptomaniac”. It 
may be so. Legal personality and criminal accountability of AI entities may be no-
                                                          
11 The Picciotto Robot hypothesis deals with a robot security guard, deprived of free will or 
moral sense, which is used by a gang to carry out criminal enterprises. Reynolds and Ishi-
kawa conclude: “As such, it seems that the robot is just an instrument just as factory which 
produces illegal products might be. The robot in this case should not be arrested, but perhaps 
impounded and auctioned.” Reynolds, C., & Ishikawa, M.: Robotic thugs. Ethicomp Pro-
ceedings, Global e-SCM Research Center & Meiji University, pp. 487–492 (2007). 
12 The Robot Kleptomaniac has free will and self-chosen goals and, when confronted with a 
fixed supply of energy that is running low, chooses to rob batteries from a local convenience 
store. 
13 The Robot Falsifier example creates awareness for the fact that the Legal Tender project 
claimed that viewers could remotely operate a robotic system to physically alter purportedly 
authentic money. 
where soon. But, living in an ever-evolving world as we do, means that the notion of 
fully autonomous AI entities or robots is not totally unthinkable, either in battlefields 
or in our civil life. This argument surely gives grounds to further legal and technical 
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